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INTRODUCTION 
Access to formal sector loans is typically contingent on factors such as an 
individual’s repayment ability, their ability to meet the collateral requirement, and the 
institution’s perception of their creditworthiness. These issues are further compounded in 
developing countries with high levels of poverty, where the poor and the less-educated, 
who represent large sections of the population, are often priced out of the formal credit 
markets. These factors affect females relatively more because they tend to be over-
represented among the poor. Although governments and non-governmental organizations 
in many developing countries through microcredit programs have attempted to promote 
microenterprise or income generation activities, studies from Bangladesh (Webb et al, 
2002; Halder and Mosley, 2004), show that the ultra-poor lacking livelihood resources 
are reluctant to borrow due to their fear of being overburdened. They were moreover, 
found to have a fear of the cash economy. For example, Webb et al. (2002) find that 
84% of the poor women in their sample refused to borrow because of their fear of debt, 
and due to their concerns of other people’s perception of them being in debt. Similarly, 
in a recent study from Indonesia, Johnston and Morduch (2007) find that in their sample, 
nearly half of the creditworthy poor households were averse to taking debt and did not 
 seek credit. The incidence of debt aversion was found to be relatively stable across 
income groups.  
Under these circumstances, informal networks, such as friends and family 
members, often play an important role in supporting the credit needs of low-income 
individuals who lack collateral, lack knowledge of formal sector markets or when formal 
sector markets are unable to meet their credit requirements fully. Alternatively, 
individuals may simply feel more comfortable borrowing from family members rather 
than banks due to the administrative process involved in obtaining formal-sector loans. 
Consequently, access to loans from internal networks may lower the propensity to borrow 
from formal sector markets. In this paper, using the nationally representative Indonesian 
Family Life Survey dataset (IFLS-3), we examine if access to loans from informal 
networks such as family and friends influences borrowing behavior in formal credit 
markets. We first analyze how family networks shape an individual’s expectations of 
being able to borrow internally. Then, conditional on this expectation, we investigate an 
individual’s knowledge of formal credit markets and their likelihood of borrowing from 
formal credit sources.  
Despite the advantages of family networks as a source of credit (e.g., quick to 
obtain with little or no administrative cost), it is ultimately a risky strategy since it 
increases the vulnerability of borrowers to exogenous economic shocks in the event of 
unavailability of credit from family members. This is particularly true if family members 
face similar economic circumstances. Furthermore, individuals who rely heavily on 
family transfers to satisfy their credit requirements may have few incentives to seek 
formal credit. However, access to formal sector credit has many advantages such as 
fostering greater independence, promoting greater repayment discipline and giving 
individuals the opportunity to access larger loans. Another consideration is that in our 
dataset, females tend to rely on internal loans relatively more than males do and have a 
lower likelihood of being able to identify a formal sector lender.1 The impact of access 
to internal loans on borrowing behavior in the formal credit market is also different for 
males and females. To explore these gender differences more fully, we conduct separate 
analysis for males and females.  
Our analysis has policy implications on the issue of whether to target female 
borrowers. Developing countries such as Bangladesh, Bolivia and India have extended 
microcredit programs to women as a key strategy for poverty alleviation by encouraging 
formation of micro-enterprises. In Indonesia, despite the plethora of microcredit 
institutions and the success of the cooperative-style bank BRD (Bank Rakyat Desa) and 
the state-owned people’s bank BRI (Bank Rakyat Indonesia) in initiating small business, 
a national-level microcredit program targeted at women is lacking. The share of female 
borrowers in BRI, the largest provider of microcredit (i.e., small credit up to Rp.50 
million (US$9262)) in the country, is low, and has in fact declined from 24% in 1996 
(Ravicz, 1999) to 18% in 2002 (Khawari, 2004). Nevertheless, there is evidence that 
females are willing to participate in microcredit initiatives (Ravicz, 1999). Our results 
suggest that policies which specifically target females can help in alleviating their excess 




 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Indonesia has a number of microfinance programs that provide financial services 
to low income households. The main microfinance (MFI) providers in Indonesia include 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI), Badan Perkreditan Rakyat (BPR), private banks, 
cooperatives (e.g., Koperasi Unit Desa (KUD)), semi-formal financial institutions (e.g., 
Lembaga Dana dan Kredit Pedesaan (LDKP) and Badan Kredit Desa (BKD)), 
International bodies (e.g., the World Bank), the national pawnshop (Perum Pegadaian, 
PP), and the national post office.  
The largest microfinance provider is the Village Bank operated by BRI (BRI-
UD), whose vast and deep outreach is in part due to its successful saving mobilization 
initiatives which lowers the cost of credit provision to rural areas. However, in terms of 
access to credit, key shortcomings of the BRI–UD are that loans are typically made to the 
better-off among the poor and to established entrepreneurs. Furthermore, borrowers are 
required to put up collateral, although the collateral in this context is often defined 
loosely, and the banking staff are allowed some discretion to increase the loan size for 
reliable borrowers that lack collateral. The BRI also charges net annual effective interest 
rates of approximately 32%, and allows clients to borrow upto a maximum of Rp 50 
million (Johnston and Morduch 2007). As Takahashi et al (2010) note, although the BRI 
has an excellent reputation in terms of the number of clients, high repayment rates, and 
profitability, poor individuals with insufficient collateral and/or those individuals or those 
whose loan requirements are small, are unable to access credit from BRI. See Hamada 
(2010) for an overview of the microfinance industry in Indonesia. 
Thus, individuals with insufficient collateral, typically the poor, tend to rely on 
loans from informal moneylenders at high interest rates or from friends and family, 
whose supply of funds is likely to be limited (Conning and Udry 2007). Recent studies 
have questioned whether microcredit programs reduce poverty. Using Indonesian data 
Takahashi et al (2010) study if microcredit improves the welfare of its clients and 
whether it helps the poor. They find that although microcredit can potentially contribute 
to the reduction of intergenerational poverty through schooling investment, its impact on 
poverty alleviation is limited. Studies from India (Banerjee et al., 2009) and the 
Philippines (Karlan and Zinman, 2009) also find little evidence of a significant impact of 
microcredit on poverty reduction. Both Banerjee et al (2009) and Karlan and Zinman 
(2009) use randomized controlled experiments to evaluate the impact of microcredit on 
poor households. Banerjee et al. (2009) show that in Indian slums there is no statistically 
significant difference in expenditures per capita and expenditures on education and health 
for the group that received microcredit. Karlan and Zinman (2009) similarly show that in 
the Philippines, there is no statistically significant difference in household income, the 
probability of being under the poverty line, and the quality of food between the treatment 
and control groups. 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings of the microfinance programs for the poor, 
the literature has also identified large gender differences in access to formal credit 
markets (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Hashemi et al, 1996). It is hypothesized that female 
borrowers in developing countries face greater constraints in the formal credit markets 
due to their limited opportunities for wage employment in the formal sector (see Berger, 
1989). They are more likely to be employed in the unorganized, informal sector of the 
economy, self-employed in small-scale farming, domestic services or petty trading (see 
 Khawari, 2004; Berger, 1989). Moreover, the share of women borrowers is low in 
Indonesia’s BRI for example, and has declined from 24% in 1996 (Ravicz, 1999), to 
18% in 2002 (Khawari, 2004). Previous studies have found a strong positive link 
between women’s access to credit and the welfare of their household (Sharma, 2002; 
Chemin, 2003). In particular, Panjaitan-Drioadisuryo and Cloud’s (1999) study of 
Indonesian married women who had accessed loans from the Small Farmers 
Development Program (SFDP),2 finds that women consistently devote their additional 
income to more nutritious food, better health care and education for their children. 
These authors find that women are more creditworthy relative to men, as the program 
recorded a 17% higher repayment rate relative to BKK (Badan Kredit Kecamatan), 
which also lends to men. By exploring if there is a gender dimension to borrowing in 
formal markets, our analysis fills a gap in the literature on credit markets in Indonesia 
(see previous studies by Okten and Osili, 2004; Panjaitan-Pradisuryo and Cloud, 1999; 
Gertler et al, 2001). Gender-induced differences in borrowing behavior arise if potential 
female borrowers have lower education and income levels relative to males, and a 
lower attachment to the labor market. Since these factors are typically used by formal-
sector lenders to assess the creditworthiness of potential borrowers, we expect to 
observe relatively more females than males borrowing from internal networks.  
 
DATA AND ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
The data for this study comes from the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFL3) 
conducted in 2000. The IFLS3 is a nationally representative random sample survey, 
covering thirteen of the 27 provinces, where approximately 83% of the population 
resides. The data are unique and ideal for our analysis. It contains data on an 
individual’s economic and labor market characteristics, their household-level 
demographic characteristics and also detailed information at the individual-level on 
transfers among family members. Furthermore, there is community-level information 
on infrastructure, such as the availability of financial institutions, and the quality and 
accessibility of public facilities in the community.  
The analysis in this paper is based on 25,250 adults (aged 15 years and above) 
for whom complete information is available on our variables of interest. The summary 
statistics of all the variables used in the analysis are reported in Appendix A. Overall, 
34% of the sample received at least one internal loan in the last 12 months prior to the 
survey. 3 The differences in these descriptive statistics by gender are noteworthy, as 
discussed in the introduction. We observe that 73% of the sample is aware of at least 
one source of formal credit (e.g., banks or non-bank institutions like cooperatives and 
employers)4, though the figure is lower among female respondents where we observe 
only 68% being able to identify a formal source of credit. We note that 13% of these 
individuals (10% of the sample) made at least one attempt to borrow from a formal 
credit institution during the year. Questions on borrowing behavior were only asked 
conditional on knowledge. 
While 36% percent of females in our sample borrowed from internal networks, 
the figure is 30% for males. Relative to males, a smaller proportion of females have 
knowledge of formal credit sources and borrowed from this source. Females also tend 
to borrow a much lower amount relative to males. For example, the size of a loan made 
to females on average is less than half the size of a loan made to males. We note that 
 the data only records the amount of loans received by individuals which may not be the 
same as the amount that they had asked for. Nevertheless, to the extent that individuals 
can have multiple borrowing attempts (perhaps from other formal lenders) during the 
year, the total amount of loans would be representative of the amount required by the 
respondent. Of all applicants, only 40 applicants (1.6%) made an attempt and did not 
receive any loan by the end of the year. Unfortunately, no further information is 
available on these individuals, particularly with regards to whether they stopped after 
the failed attempt, or whether they attempted to borrow again but did not succeed. In 
our data we do not observe the interest rates faced by the individual in the formal and 
informal credit markets nor do we observe the size of internal loans. What we do 
observe are individuals’ demographic, socio-economic characteristics, and residential 
characteristics. These observables may reflect variations in income, and cost of 
borrowing from external sources. Furthermore, those individuals with higher income 
levels, better ability to access information on external borrowing (e.g., those with better 
work-networks, labor market attachment) will have lower external borrowing costs. 
While the other demographic characteristics are approximately similar across both 
females and males, only 11% of the female respondents in our sample are household 
heads, whereas the figure is 60% in the case of males. 
In sub-sections below we describe our econometric strategy. Our analysis 
consists of two parts. Firstly, we explore the formation of individual expectations of 
receiving an internal loan. Limited empirical studies exist to give us precedent over 
what factors influence internal borrowing behavior. We anticipate that the respondent’s 
individual and economic characteristics and the number of internal networks will 
influence internal loans. Secondly, we present an econometric model to analyze how 
the expectation of internal loans affect an individual’s propensity to access information 
on formal credit opportunities and their likelihood of borrowing from formal markets.  
 
1. Expected access to internal loans 
We first consider the case in which family lenders do not discriminate among 
borrowers from their family based on their economic characteristics. Hence, an 
individual’s expectation of receiving an internal loan is a function only of the 
availability of family members and can be written as: 
( )iiiii XfemaleSPdE 43210)X|( ααααα ++++Φ=    (1) 
where di is a binary variable indicating whether or not the individual received an 
internal loan/transfer in the last 12 months. Eqn (1) is estimated using a probit model. 
On the right-hand side of equation (1), the terms Pi and Si denote parental and 
siblings’ characteristics, respectively. A dummy variable is included to indicate if 
individuals have made any internal loans to family members in the last 12 months. If it 
is the case that relatively well-off individuals are more likely to be making internal 
loans/transfers to family members, then (1) for these individuals would be lower. 
Certain individuals however may naturally expect higher (or lower) access to internal 
loans. For example, females are more likely to receive internal loans. Their lower 
attachment to the labor market and their relatively lower levels of income may make 
them more inclined to rely on internal networks for their credit requirements. To 
account for this, we include a dummy variable for the gender of the respondent. The 
variable femalei takes on a value of 1 for females and 0 otherwise. Finally, Xi includes 
 the respondent’s demographic characteristics such as their age, age squared and marital 
status.  
Next we allow individual’s economic characteristics to also influence whether 
or not they receive internal loans. Hence, we re-write equation (1) to also include the 
economic characteristics of the respondent as below: 
( )iiiiii RXfemaleSPRdE 543210),X|( ββββββ +++++Φ=  (2) 
where the term Ri denotes a [1 x j] vector of j variables that reflect an individual’s 
economic characteristics, such as their assets, their educational attainment and their 
employment status. The effect of these measures on the likelihood of obtaining internal 
loans is ambiguous. For example, better education, higher assets and better 
employment reflect individuals’ higher repayment ability, which may make family 
members more likely to lend to them. However, these variables are also likely to 
increase an individuals’ knowledge of formal financial markets, and their ability to 
access formal sector loans, which makes them less likely to rely on internal loans.  
 
2. Propensity to seek information on formal(non-family) loan sources 
To test the relationship between expected access to internal loan and 
borrowing behavior in the formal credit markets, we estimate the following equation: 
 iiiiiiii ZHRXfemaledk νθθθθθθθ +++++++= 6543210 ˆ   (3)  
In equation (3), the term ki denotes a respondent’s awareness or knowledge of 
external credit sources. The term idˆ  refers to the endogenous expectation of receiving 
an internal loan. Conceptually, borrowing behavior in the formal credit markets take 
into account the probability of getting internal loans idˆ . If 01 <θ  then accessibility to 
internal loans reduces the gains from searching for external loans, such that individuals 
would be less likely to know of external loan providers. Furthermore, our raw data 
suggesting that females are less knowledgeable of external borrowing options would be 
confirmed if 02 <θ . The terms X and R are defined as before, while H denotes 
additional control variables reflecting an individual’s potential information channels 
such as spouse’s characteristics, household composition, and residential location. 
Finally, Z denotes village characteristics to capture the level of development in the 
respondent’s village.  
To provide consistent and efficient estimates of (3), following Newey (1987) 
we estimate an Amemiya Generalized Least Square (AGLS) estimator (Adkins, 2008; 
Maddala, 1983). This estimator provides a consistent estimator of the standard errors for 
subsequent hypothesis testing of the parameters. The estimation procedure involves 
estimating a series of probit models (see Adkins, 2009 for details). For example, access 
to internal loans is estimated as a function of parental and sibling characteristics 
(instruments) plus all the exogenous variables in (3). The residual and predicted values 
are then saved to be used in the next stage of the estimations. Specifically, a probit 
model with dependent variable k is estimated as a function of all covariates as before 
and the saved residual term. The purpose of this step is to obtain the coefficient on the 
residual term and the covariance matrix of the coefficients of the remaining covariates. 
Subsequently, another probit model is estimated with dependent variable k as a 
function of idˆ  (the endogenous probability of getting internal loans and which is 
 estimated from the linear model in the first stage), exogenous variables and the residual 
term. The point of this regression is to obtain the difference of the coefficients on the 
residuals and idˆ  to be used as part of a correction term, which will form the “weights”, 
in the AGLS estimator of (3).5  
 
3. Propensity to apply for loans from formal credit institutions 
Would an individual’s expectation of receiving internal loans reduce their 
propensity to borrow from formal institutions? Recall that we are faced with a sample 
selection problem, as only those individuals who could identify a formal credit source 
(ki =1) were asked further questions on borrowing behavior. For instance, individuals 
whose credit requirements are high may prefer to borrow from formal lenders and will 
seek out information on formal credit options. To address this issue, we estimate a 
censored probit model, where we use village-level characteristics to satisfy the 
exclusion restrictions. The justification for using these instruments is that the 
infrastructure conditions at the village-level reflect the local information networks, but 
do not directly influence an individual’s decision to borrow in the formal credit market.  
The estimation results from the selection models find evidence for non-
random selection conditional on covariates, with positive correlation coefficients 
between the error terms of selection and outcome equations at the 5% significance 
level.6 However, this selection was driven by the distinct behavior of male and female 
respondents in a pooled sample, and disappears when we estimate the model separately 
by gender. The probability that the unobservable-driven selection is negligible is 43% 
and 77% for males and females respectively, and both are much larger than the critical 
threshold of 5%. Thus, the outcome (borrowing) equation can be estimated on the 
knowledgeable population disaggregated by gender.      
To test the relevance of internal loans on external borrowing propensity, we 
estimate 
iiiiiii uHRXfemaledb ++++++= 543210 ˆ δδδδδδ  ,   (4) 
Where bi is a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if individual i made at least one 
external borrowing attempt(s) (regardless of outcome) in the last 12 months. Equation 
(4) is also estimated using AGLS. 
We are also interested in the issue of whether internal loans are typically used 
for specific purposes such as for non-business related activity. In other words, is it the 
case that the expectation of internal loans has little effect on external borrowing 
behavior for business purposes? In the survey, respondents were asked to identify what 
they intended to do with their loans from an array of possibilities. One of these 
possibilities is “borrowing for business”. We categorize the variable b into: (i) bb if any 
loan was intended for business-purposes; and (ii) bn if all loans were for non-business 
purposes, such as to purchase household goods, pay for ceremonial occasions and daily 
expenses. Equation (4) is re-estimated with these new dependent variables. In 
estimating (i), i.e., borrowing for business, those borrowing for non-business purposes are 
excluded from the sample so that we compare only borrowers for business against non-
borrowers. We note that 71% of loans received by female borrowers are non-business 
loans, while for male borrowers this share is only slightly lower at 67%. Finally, we 
test the impact of receipt of internal loans on the size of formal sector loans. OLS 
 regressions are therefore estimated on the log scale of these amounts.7 The covariates 
are those used in the borrowing equation (4).  
 
RESULTS 
Our main estimation results are presented in Tables 1-3. In Table 1, we report 
probit coefficients and marginal effects for the likelihood of accessing internal loans 
conditional on parent and sibling characteristics, calculated at (gender-specific) sample 
means. In Table 2, we report the coefficients and marginal effects for the expectation of 
accessing an internal loan conditional on an individual’s economic characteristics. In 
Table 3, we report the coefficients for idˆ  for equations (3) and (4), and the loan 
amount. As our main focus is on the role of internal loans on borrowing behavior, we 
report the full set of results in Appendix B. 
Initially, we estimated equations (1) and (2) for the full-sample, but found the 
poolability assumption restrictive. The poolability refers to the assumption that 
differences between male and female borrowing behavior can be sufficiently captured 
by a dummy variable for gender. However, the slope estimates are also different for 
males and females in the sample. In the probit model, the slope coefficients ],[ βα  and 
scales (overall variance) are inseparable such that differences in either the coefficients 
or scales, or both, would influence the size of the estimates.8 Thus, we estimated the 
equations separately for males and females, and we computed the predictions based on 
these estimates. From Table 1, we observe that for an “average” male or female, 
parental characteristics have a minor effect on expectations of receiving an internal 
loan. In contrast, the characteristics of non-coresiding siblings are significant 
determinants of the likelihood of receiving internal loans and transfers. Our analysis 
indicates that females who have economically active siblings and/or those who are in 
close contact with their siblings have a greater expectation of receiving internal loans. 
For males, only the latter effect is statistically significant. However, females with no 
siblings tend to find it more difficult to obtain internal loans than males in the same 
situation. We observe that the marginal effect for absence of siblings is slightly larger 
for females than for males. Compared to females with siblings, those without siblings 
are 15 percentage points less likely to have access to internal loans.  
Interestingly, there is a positive relationship between provision and receipt of 
internal loans. 9 A priori we would expect that individuals making loans to family 
members are relatively wealthier members of families, so it is surprising that they are 
also more likely to receive loans. The positive relationship, however, suggests that 
family networks may act as a consumption-smoothing mechanism between its 
members. Both of these conditions appear to suggest that family members may face 
similar economic constraints. Married individuals are found to have lower expectations 
of transfers from their own families relative to respondents in the unmarried or 
widowed categories. Finally, the effect of age is non-linear, so that the expectation of 
receiving internal loans decreases until the age of 61 years for males and 64 years for 
females. In particular, the elderly are more reliant on monetary transfers from family 




TABLE 1. PROBIT ESTIMATES ON EXPECTATIONS  
OF AN INTERNAL LOAN 
 Male   Female   
 Coeff (s.e) ME Coeff s.e ME 
Parent  char.       
Mother only -0.030 (0.035) -0.010 -0.051 (0.033) -0.019 
Father only -0.040 (0.055) -0.014 0.075 (0.050) 0.029 
None 0.014 (0.070) 0.005 -0.086 (0.062) -0.032 
Sibling char.       
# econ active 0.029 (0.020) 0.010 0.056 (0.019)*** 0.021 
# nearby 0.000 (0.011) -0.000 -0.008 (0.010) -0.003 
# seen regularly 0.029 (0.011)*** 0.010 0.028 (0.010)*** 0.011 
Mean age 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 
No sibling -0.418 (0.049)*** -0.134 -0.435 (0.043)*** -0.151 
Individual char.       
Provide loan 0.284 (0.028)*** 0.099 0.180 (0.026)*** 0.068 
Age -0.056 (0.005)*** -0.007 -0.039 (0.004)*** -0.006 
Agesq 0.000 (0.000)***  0.000 (0.000)***  
Married -0.192 (0.047)*** -0.068 -0.219 (0.039)*** -0.082 
Separated 0.166 (0.084)*** 0.063 0.097 (0.053)*** 0.038 
Constant 0.900 (0.091)***  0.701 (0.076)***  
Log L -6,996   -8,444   
Pseudo R-sq 0.054   0.035   
N 11,959   13,291   
Note: *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level. ME denotes marginal effects. ME for Age is 
calculated taking into account Agesq. Separated include widow and divorced. The reference 









TABLE 2. PROBIT RESULTS ON EXPECTATIONS OF INTERNAL LOANS 
CONDITIONAL ON INDIVIDUAL’S ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
  Male     Female     
  Coeff (s.e) ME Coeff (s.e.) ME 
Parent char.       
Mother only -0.025 (0.035) -0.009 -0.053 (0.033) -0.020 
Father only -0.038 (0.055) -0.013 0.074 (0.050) 0.028 
None 0.005 (0.070) 0.002 -0.082 (0.062) -0.031 
Sibling char.       
# econ active 0.051 (0.021)** 0.018 0.071 (0.020)*** 0.027 
# nearby -0.004 (0.011) -0.001 -0.009 (0.010) -0.003 
# seen regularly 0.031 (0.011)*** 0.011 0.028 (0.010)*** 0.010 
Mean age 0.000 (0.001) -0.000 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 
No sibling -0.408 (0.051)*** -0.130 -0.391 (0.044)*** -0.136 
Individual char.       
Provide loan 0.327 (0.029)*** 0.114 0.215 (0.026)*** 0.081 
Age -0.045 (0.005)*** -0.022 -0.030 (0.004)*** -0.014 
Agesq 0.000 (0.000)***  0.000 (0.000)***  
Married -0.150 (0.049)*** -0.052 -0.248 (0.041)*** -0.094 
Separated 0.179 (0.085)** 0.067 0.070 (0.054) 0.027 
Economic char.       
Log(asset) -0.038 (0.008)*** -0.013 -0.057 (0.007)*** -0.021 
Primary school -0.090 (0.057) -0.032 0.052 (0.039) 0.019 
Junior high -0.165 (0.063)*** -0.057 0.081 (0.049)* 0.030 
Senior high -0.082 (0.063) -0.029 0.113 (0.049)** 0.042 
Post-school 0.025 (0.075) 0.009 0.254 (0.065)*** 0.097 
Self-employed -0.226 (0.044)*** -0.082 -0.049 (0.032) -0.019 
Unpaid worker -0.089 (0.056) -0.033 -0.101 (0.036)*** -0.038 
Public sector -0.553 (0.068)*** -0.182 -0.415 (0.078)*** -0.146 
Private sector -0.258 (0.041)*** -0.093 -0.153 (0.033)*** -0.057 
Constant 1.567 (0.154)***  1.414 (0.133)***  
Log L -6938   -8390   
Pseudo R-sq 0.062   0.041   
N 11,959     13,291     
Note: *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. ME denotes 
marginal effects. ME for Age is calculated taking into account Agesq. Included in estimation is a dummy 
variable for missing asset. 
 
 Table 2 presents results with individual’s economic characteristics included in 
the access to internal loans model. The Log-likelihood Ratio (LR) test of joint 
restriction that economic characteristics are irrelevant is rejected with ample evidence 
(i.e., p-value of zero). For both males and females, the provision of loan remains 
positively related to the receipt of loans, controlling for wealth. However, independent 
wealth effect is negatively correlated with expectations of access to internal loan. For 
male respondents, the economic factors act to lower expectations of internal loans. For 
instance, relative to males with no education, those with Junior High levels of 
education have lower expectations of receiving an internal loan. For females, on the 
other hand, while higher wealth and employment status lower expectations of internal 
loans, higher educational attainment tends to increase their expectations of an internal 
loan. One possible explanation for this is to do with a J-shaped nexus between education 
and labor supply for Indonesian women (Widarti, 1998). Other studies using Indonesian 
data also provide evidence of a non-linear effect of education on working hours (Kim and 
Aassve, 2006). They find that for less than six years of schooling, there is a positive 
effect of education on hours worked for females, while for more than six years of 
schooling, higher education implies reduced hours worked. Hence, it is possible that the 
women in our sample are better educated, but non-participation in the labor market may 
restrict their ability to access loans in formal credit markets, thus increasing their reliance 
on loans from family members.  Figure 1 plots the distributions of expected access to 
internal loans separately for males and females. The gender differences in borrowing 
behavior are noteworthy, with the distributions for males being more spread out (i.e., 
have larger variance), while those for females are relatively concentrated around the 
mean. However, in each group, the expectations of internal loan unconditional and 
conditional of economic characteristics track one another quite closely, particularly for 
females.  
Table 3 presents the estimation results for equations (3) and (4) and loan 
amount equation. According to Table 3, better access to internal loans does not lower 
an individual’s propensity to seek out formal credit. Instead, our results indicate that 
accessibility to internal loans: (i) increases the propensity of individuals to search for 
external loan sources; (ii) increases the propensity to borrow among females, 
particularly for non-business purposes; and (iii) increases the amount borrowed by 
males by an average of Rp.5,400 (2000US$0.67, calculated at the sample mean of 
Rp.326,553 or 2000US$40), for a one percentage point increase in idˆ . Thus, our results 
suggest that the two loan sources are “complementing” one another.  
One possible explanation for this may be that our measure of access to internal 
loans does not sufficiently capture the amount obtainable from internal networks. For 
instance, we take into account the extent of internal networks. However, it is possible 
that although individuals from large families have many potential lenders, these lenders 
can only lend a small amount, even cumulatively. If these individuals require larger 
loans they then have to borrow from formal credit sources. The dataset has information 
on the size of the internal loan, but there are many missing values.  
  
  
FIGURE 1. EXPECTATIONS OF INTERNAL LOAN 
 
Note: the vertical axis plots the kernel density (%) and the horizontal axis plots predicted 
probability of internal loan. The solid line represents )|( ΧdE  series and the dotted line 
represents ),|( RdE Χ  series. The means for males and females are 0.31 and 0.37, respectively. 
 
TABLE 3. COEFFICIENTS OF dˆ  
    Male     Female     
No Model Coeff.  (s.e.) N Coeff.  (s.e.) N 
1 dˆ  on Knowledge  0.862 (0.193)*** 11,959 0.237 (0.156) 13,291 
2 dˆ   on Borrow -0.106 (0.238) 9,382 0.558 (0.238)** 8,973 
3 dˆ   on Borrow for 
business 
-0.345 (0.355) 8,456 0.578 (0.391) 8,190 
4 dˆ   on Borrow for 
non-business 
0.001 (0.265) 8,964 0.497 (0.259)* 8,650 
5 dˆ   on Total loan 
amount 
1.415 (0.672)** 1,295 -0.347 (0.760) 1,085 
Note: *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. For total 
loan amount, the model is estimated using 2SLS (two stage least square).  
 
To summarize the other results of formal credit activities in the knowledge 
equation, we note that educated individuals and those in the workforce are more likely 
to be aware of formal credit markets. Wealthier individuals and those actively involved 
in community activities are also more likely to be aware of formal providers. These 
results are not surprising. Employment and community participation also has strong 
positive effects in the borrowing equation for both males and females. Disaggregating 
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 educated and self-employed individuals are more likely to borrow for business 
purposes. Consumption loans are more likely for individuals from female-headed 
households. Our analysis shows that for females, being employed in government jobs 
improves access to formal credit markets. This may be because they have better 
opportunities for obtaining loans and can ask for larger-sized loans. Education is 
another important factor that increases the likelihood of receiving larger loans.  
 
PREDICTIONS  
In this section, we use the estimated equations to assess the education strategy. 
To isolate the role of education, the effects of other socio-demographics were held 
constant at reference levels. Table 4 summarizes the characteristics for the reference 
male and female. Except for location and province, the levels were selected based on 
sample means or the majority case for binary variables.    
 
TABLE 4. CHARACTERISTICS OF REFERENCE INDIVIDUALS 
Socio-demographics Male Female 
Age 36 36 
Marital status Married Married 
Head of household Yes No 
Muslim Yes Yes 
# adults 4 4 
# children 1 1 
# elderly (>=50 years)  1 1 
Asset (log scale) 16 16 
Employment Self-employed Not working 
Community activities 
participated 2 in 5 1 in 5 
Spouse working No Yes 
Spouse education Primary  Primary 




Market, post-office, bank, no 
govt program 
Market, post-office, bank, no 
govt program 
Province Jakarta Jakarta (capital) 
  
There is little dispute that internal loans have desirable properties from the 
borrower’s perspective (e.g., they may not require collateral, there may be some 
repayment flexibility and the interest rates on borrowing may be low or have no 
interest requirement). However, since internal loans are not always available, policies 
that aim to improve access to formal credit markets would allow people to maintain 
their consumption pattern. Education in particular can be part of a strategy to increase 
 an individual’s knowledge of formal borrowing opportunities and improve their credit-
worthiness.  
The interactions between knowledge of formal sector borrowing sources, 
expected access to internal loans, and education levels are depicted in Figure 2. As the 
reference individuals are effectively the “average” male or female, the slope at each 
point is effectively the marginal effects of expected access to internal loan on the 
likelihood of an external loan for individuals with different education levels. As 
expected, education generally increases knowledge of formal credit markets. In the 
male sample, less educated males, particularly those with no schooling, who expect to 
have higher access to internal loans, also have a high probability of seeking out formal 
sector loans. The lines get flatter at higher education levels, reaching a level close to 
one, suggesting that higher education reduces the role of internal networks on formal 
borrowing activities. At the mean dˆ  level of 40%, the marginal effects range from a 
large value of 0.32 for males with no schooling to 0.05 for males with a college 
education. For females, the influence of internal loans is largely independent of 
education levels, but as in the case for males, there is a gradient for those with no 
schooling. At the dˆ  level of 40%, the marginal effect for females with no schooling is 
0.09. A comparison of the left and right panels of Figure 2 shows us the extent of the 
gender gap. In particular we observe females having a lower propensity of having 
knowledge of formal credit markets compared to males at any education level.  
 
 
FIGURE 2. RESPONDENT’s EDUCATION AND KNOWLEDGE OF  














Note: each line represents the knowledge propensity for the reference individual.  
 
Figure 3 depicts the interactions between borrowing activities and expected 
access to internal loans for respondents of different education levels. The distinct trend 
in female and male borrowing behavior is clear. For males, there is a modest negative 
relationship between dˆ  and borrowing for business purposes. Among females, we note 
that the relationship between external borrowing and dˆ  is positive. Furthermore, 
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 suggested by steeper lines). We speculate that one explanation for this may be because 
internal networks improve a female respondent’s access to information on formal credit 
markets.  
In Figure 3, the lowest line, for both types of loans and for both males and 
females, are referring to those with no formal schooling. This suggests that education is 
crucial in influencing access to formal credit institutions. Females with no schooling 
have a very low probability of borrowing for business purposes. It is worth noting that 
better educated females have a substantially higher probability of borrowing in formal 
markets, even relative to reference males with a college education.  
Borrowing for non-business purposes by male respondents is insensitive to 
their expectations of internal loans. For females, just as in the case of business loans, 
we find that the propensity to borrow in the formal sector increases with greater 
expectations of access to internal loans. Upward sloping curves are consistent with the 
loan sources being complements. However, as we observe, the lines are flatter for 
higher educated females (senior high or college graduates). In other words, education 
reduces a female respondent’s dependency on internal loans.  
 
 
 FIGURE 3. RESPONDENT’S EDUCATION LEVEL AND  
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 In this paper using data from Indonesia, we analyzed the relationship between 
access to internal loans and borrowing behavior in the formal credit market. For some 
individuals, specifically those with high expectations of receiving an internal loan, the 
requirement for external loans may be expected to be secondary. We test this prediction 
and analyze external loan activities for different levels of access to internal loan.  
The main results from our analysis can be summarized as follows: First, we note 
gender differences in borrowing behavior. Specifically we find that access to internal 
loans is different for male and female respondents, with females having a higher 
expectation of receiving internal loans compared to males. There is some support for 
consumption-smoothing among family members, as we observe recipients of internal 
loans also being providers of internal loans. However, even among family members, we 
find that the economic characteristics of the borrowers play a crucial role in their 
likelihood of receiving an internal loan. Empirically we find that access to internal loans 
does not adversely affect an individual’s propensity to seek credit in the formal market. 
On the other hand, the expectation of internal loans increases the likelihood of improving 
information on formal credit sources, particularly for males. Furthermore, we find that 
the borrowing propensity in formal credit markets for males is not affected by their 
expected access to internal loans, and also increases the size of the amount that they 
borrow in the formal sector. For females, the pattern is different, with expectations of an 
internal loan increasing the propensity to borrow. We also note that the borrowing 
propensity of females in formal credit markets is positively related to their ability to 
access internal loans. This positive relationship suggests that loans from internal 
networks and the formal credit market act as complements rather than substitutes.  
Several policy implications flow from our study. Firstly, the benefits of having 
microcredit programs targeted at women have been successfully demonstrated in the 
case of Bangladesh, India and Bolivia. Our study has established large gender 
differences in respondent’s ability to identify formal sector credit institutions, with 
employed women in particular having better access to formal credit facilities. This 
suggests that formal sector lenders face large screening and monitoring costs, and 
therefore prefer lending to employed women to ensure regular repayments. The 
introduction of a microcredit program modelled along the lines of Bangladesh’s 
successful Grameen Bank would reduce informational asymmetries. The microcredit 
programs can be implemented through community programs like sponsorship of 
women’s group and having field workers (could be the women themselves who have 
been successful) to monitor performance. For example, microcredit institutions typically 
use a group-lending mechanism, replicating the village-lending tradition, which relies 
on self-formed groups to minimize asymmetric information problems, through the use 
of peer-screening, social pressure and peer-monitoring. Furthermore, the small regular 
repayment schedules imposed by microcredit institutions allow women to partition 
their commitments into manageable levels. Similarly, dynamic incentives, which 
reward good credit history in the form of possibilities for larger loan amounts in future, 
ensures continuing creditworthiness of their borrowers.  
Secondly, we note that contingent on knowledge of formal sector institutions, a 
relatively higher proportion of women borrowed from informal credit sources. From our 
descriptive statistics we observe that 30% of the female respondents borrowed for 
business purposes and approximately 14% of women work in unpaid family business. 
 This highlights an entrepreneurial spirit among Indonesian women, and indicates perhaps 
an unmet need for credit. The implementation of microcredit programs along the lines 
described above would be welfare-enhancing under these circumstances. 
Finally, our study has highlighted the important role of education and social 
networks. Our results show that at any education level, females have a lower likelihood 
of having knowledge of formal sector credit markets compared to males. Policy 
initiatives to promote education will have the effect of improving knowledge of formal 
credit markets, which in turn may lower demand for internal loans and subsequently 














1. An internal loan is defined as monetary transfers (loans or tuition) excluding values of 
in-kind transfers such as food items from any of non-coresiding parent(s), sibling(s), or 
child(ren) in the last 12 months.  
2. It is a targeted credit-plus extension program of the Ministry of Agriculture with 
sponsors from Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and International Fund for 
Agricultural Development (IFAD).    
3. In our dataset, information on transfers between coresiding family members is not 
available. Moreover, these types of transfers are difficult to record anyway as they 
happen regularly. Hence, for the rest of the paper internal networks refer to non-
coresiding family members. We use the terms internal loans and internal transfers 
interchangeably as it is not possible to distinguish between transfers requiring 
compulsory repayment and those without compulsory repayment schedule from the 
questionnaire. Internal transfers can be seen as a form of internal loan with negative 
interest rates.  
4. The specific question in the survey asks “Other than family/friends do you know of a 
place where you can borrow money?” Those individuals who answered ‘yes’ to this 
question are defined as being “knowledgeable”. Knowledgeable individuals were then 
asked a series of questions on their borrowing history. Respondents who answered ‘no’ 
(K=0) were not asked any further questions on credit markets.  
5. The model is estimated in STATA using ivprobit routine by Harkness (2004) which 
implements AGLS using Maximum Likelihood. 
6. These results are not presented here but are available from the authors on request.  
7. Only up to three borrowing activities can be recorded. Our data indicates that 72% of 
borrowers had made one attempt to borrow, and 96% had at most three attempts.   
8. The test used to determine the plausibility of pooling was based on log-likelihood 
comparisons following Swait and Louviere (1993). For instance, to achieve poolability 
of the amended model, variables for males have to be scaled by 0.88. The test for 
equality in parameters cannot be rejected following chi-sq distribution with 27 degrees 
of freedom (p-value of 0.6) and the test for equality in scale is rejected with ample 
evidence.    
9. Information on the exact pair of provider and recipient is not available. Hence, the 




APPENDIX A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 




Know= 1 if the respondent is able to identify an external (non-







Borrow= 1 if the respondent attempted to borrow from external 







Borrow business= 1 if the respondent attempted to borrow for 







Borrow non-business= 1 if the respondent attempted to borrow 





















Female=1 if female 0.526    








HH head=1 if respondent is household head 0.347 0.602 0.118 
Married= 1if the respondent is married 0.649 0.661 0.638 
Separated/widowed=1 if the respondent was previously 







Religion= 1 if Muslim 0.887 0.885 0.888 
Provided family loan= 1 if the respondent provided loan to  
family  
0.399 0.416 0.383 
Primary= 1 if highest edu. level is Primary  0.406 0.396 0.414 






































Family worker= 1 if unpaid and works for family 0.104 0.065 0.140 
Public worker=1 if employed in Public sector 0.045 0.063 0.029 
Private worker = 1 if employed in Private sector 0.253 0.343 0.172 
Self-employed = 1 if self-employed 0.277 0.351 0.210 






Participation/available community activities   0.296  0.440 0.167 
Spouse Primary= 1 if highest edu. Level of spouse is Primary  0.285 0.307 0.266 
















Spouse Post-school=1 if spouse’s highest edu. level is some 







Spouse work =1 if spouse is in employment  0.397 0.289 0.493 
Father dead=1 if respondent’s father (only) is dead  0.459 0.452 0.466 
Mother dead=1 if respondent’s mother (only) is dead 0.310 0.304 0.315 
Parent dead=1 if respondent’s parents are both dead 0.252 0.247 0.256 


















No non-coresiding siblings 0.299  0.320  0.280  






Urban 0.377 0.375 0.379 


















Sample sizea 25250 11959 13291 
a All adults in the survey including those with missing information for some variables. There are 
missing dummies for asset and community identifier, and for these observations, log of asset and 
community-level variables are replaced by zero. For spouse’s characteristics, those without spouse 
have zero values, and the dummy for marital status essentially capture the fact that for non-married 
individuals, these variables are irrelevant. Kukesra stands for Prosperous Family Loans Program. 

















APPENDIX B: TABLE 1B. PROBIT COEFFICIENTS ON KNOWLEDGE  
AND BORROWING EQUATIONS 
  Knowledge Borrow    
  Male Female Male  Female 
E(internal loan) 0.862*** 0.237 -0.106 0.558** 
Age 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.054*** 
Agesq -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
Household head 0.122** 0.199*** 0.136** 0.107 
Married -0.162** -0.084 0.144 0.377*** 
Separated/divorced -0.221** -0.082 0.097 0.176* 
Muslim 0.014 0.076 0.109 -0.047 
Primary 0.621*** 0.616*** 0.272** 0.218*** 
Junior high 1.069*** 1.052*** 0.333*** 0.164* 
Senior high 1.343*** 1.360*** 0.447*** -0.024 
Post-school 1.614*** 1.584*** 0.333** 0.086 
# adults 0.013 -0.008 0.007 0.013 
# children -0.024** -0.019* 0.018 0.025 
# elderly -0.014 -0.022 0.003 -0.047** 
Log (HH asset) 0.090*** 0.093*** -0.035*** -0.005 
Community participation 0.096** 0.079 0.207*** 0.520*** 
Spouse working 0.002 -0.021 0.033 0.033 
Spouse primary 0.082 0.089* 0.091 -0.005 
Spouse junior high 0.316*** 0.207*** 0.167** 0.013 
Spouse senior high 0.316*** 0.272*** 0.155* 0.178** 
Spouse post-school 0.320** 0.370*** 0.152 0.018 
Self-employed 0.164*** 0.226*** 0.425*** 0.436*** 
Unpaid workers 0.014 0.119*** 0.158 0.191*** 
Public workers 0.551*** 0.777*** 1.053*** 1.083*** 
Private workers 0.246*** 0.195*** 0.534*** 0.573*** 
Urban 0.027 0.106*** 0.052 0.180*** 
Have Kukesra program 0.132*** 0.041   
IDT village 0.068 0.061   
km from nearest market -0.020*** -0.033***   
km from nearest post -0.006*** -0.003   
km from nearest bank 0.002 -0.001   
Constant -2.969*** -2.761*** -2.567*** -3.711*** 
N 11959 13291 9382 8973 
LogL -5100 -6601 -3382 -2790 
d.f. 45 45 39 39 
 
  
APPENDIX B: TABLE 2B. PROBIT COEFFICIENTS ON BORROWING FOR 
BUSINESS AND NON-BUSINESS AND OLS ON LOAN AMOUNT 
 
  Business   Non-business Log(amount) 
  Male  Female Male  Female Male  Female 
E(internal loan) -0.345 0.578 0.001 0.497* 1.415** -0.347 
Age 0.062*** 0.043*** 0.018* 0.056*** 0.110*** 0.059*** 
Agesq -0.001*** -0.000** 0.000 -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001** 
Household head 0.155 -0.016 0.123 0.147 0.253 0.263 
Married 0.054 0.507*** 0.178* 0.338*** 0.121 0.263 
Separated/divorced 0.23 0.458** 0.024 0.088 0.053 0.343 
Muslim -0.053 -0.086 0.202** -0.037 -0.271 -0.186 
Primary 0.325* 0.310** 0.181 0.148* 0.445* 0.350* 
Junior high 0.463** 0.320** 0.184 0.08 0.841*** 0.601*** 
Senior high 0.610*** 0.288* 0.293** -0.153 0.991*** 0.953*** 
Post-school 0.485** 0.495** 0.201 -0.082 1.230*** 1.257*** 
# adults 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.021* 0.017 -0.009 
# children -0.008 0.012 0.029* 0.026 -0.021 -0.063 
# elderly 0.02 -0.032 -0.004 -0.050* -0.068 -0.086* 
Log (HH asset) 0.022 0.038 -0.057*** -0.023 0.359*** 0.213*** 
Comm. participation 0.196*** 0.393*** 0.188*** 0.536*** -0.271** -0.159 
Spouse working 0.149** 0.159 -0.033 -0.031 0.097 0.159 
Spouse primary 0.177* -0.041 0.04 -0.009 0.031 0.112 
Spouse junior high 0.169 -0.011 0.135 -0.001 -0.052 0.209 
Spouse senior high 0.123 0.014 0.124 0.230** 0.104 0.403** 
Spouse post-school 0.196 -0.282 0.119 0.136 0.334 0.383* 
Self-employed 0.868*** 1.026*** 0.092 0.053 -0.02 0.215* 
Unpaid workers 0.616*** 0.640*** -0.091 -0.043 -0.344 -0.006 
Public workers 0.658*** 0.572*** 1.139*** 1.130*** 0.341 0.802*** 
Private workers 0.274* 0.266** 0.581*** 0.575*** -0.564* -0.156 
Urban 0.000 0.081 0.074 0.196*** -0.094 -0.222** 
constant -4.460*** -5.114*** -2.130*** -3.394*** 4.081*** 7.445*** 
N 8456 8190 8964 8650 1295 1085 
LogL -1423 -1096 -2553 -2160 -2331 -1853 
Note: also included in the regression province dummies and a dummy variable for missing asset. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The d.f. in all 
borrowing equations and loan equations is 39.  
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